CULTURAL REALATIVISM

UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A WORLD OF DIVERSE BELIEFS AND PRACTICES

“Two familiar philosophical worries about human rights are that they are based on beliefs and attitudes that are culturally relative and that their creation and advocacy involves ethnocentrism. Human rights prescribe universal standards in areas such as security, law enforcement, equality, political participation, and education. The peoples and countries of planet Earth are, however, enormously varied in their practices, traditions, religions, and levels of economic and political development. Putting these two propositions together may be enough to justify the worry that universal human rights do not sufficiently accommodate the diversity of Earth’s peoples. A theoretical expression of this worry is “relativism”, the idea that ethical, political, and legal standards are only true or justified relative to the traditions, beliefs, and conditions of a particular country, culture or region (see the entry on moral relativism). During the drafting in 1947 of the Universal Declaration, the Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association (“AAA”) warned of the danger that the Declaration would be “a statement of rights conceived only in terms of the values prevalent in Western Europe and America”. A central concern of the AAA Board in the period right after World War II was to condemn intolerant colonialist attitudes of the day and to advocate cultural and political self-determination. But the Board also made the stronger assertion that “standards and values are relative to the culture from which they derive” and thus “what is held to be a human right in one society may be regarded as anti-social by another people” (AAA 1947).  Such assertions have continued to fuel accusations that human rights are instruments of ethnocentrism, arrogance, and cultural imperialism (Renteln 1990). Ethnocentrism is the assumption, usually unconscious, that “one’s own group is the center of everything” and that its beliefs, practices, and norms provide the standards by which other groups are “scaled and rated” (Sumner 1906; see also Etinson 2018a who argues that ethnocentrism is best understood as a kind of cultural bias rather than a belief in cultural superiority). Ethnocentrism can lead to arrogance and intolerance in dealings with other countries, ethical systems, and religions. Finally, cultural imperialism occurs when the economically, technologically, and militarily strongest countries impose their beliefs, values, and institutions on the rest of the world (for a useful discussion of several power-related concerns about human rights, see Gilabert 2018a). As in the AAA Board’s case, relativists often combine these charges with a prescription, namely that tolerance of varied practices and traditions ought to be instilled and practiced through measures that include extended learning about other cultures. The idea that relativism and exposure to other cultures promote tolerance may be correct from a psychological perspective. People who are sensitive to differences in beliefs, practices, and traditions, and who are suspicious of the grounds for extending norms across borders, may be more inclined to be tolerant of other countries and peoples than those who believe in an objective universal morality. Still, philosophers have been generally critical of attempts to argue from relativism to a prescription of tolerance (see Williams 1972 [1993] and Talbott 2005). If the culture and religion of one country has long fostered intolerant attitudes and practices, and if its citizens and officials act intolerantly towards people from other countries, they are simply following their own traditions and cultural norms. Accordingly, a relativist from a tolerant country will be hard-pressed to find a basis for criticizing the citizens and officials of the intolerant country. To do so the relativist will have to endorse a transcultural principle of tolerance and to advocate as an outsider cultural change in the direction of greater tolerance. Because of this, relativists who are deeply committed to tolerance may find themselves attracted to a qualified commitment to human rights. Perhaps for these reasons, relativism is not the stance of most anthropologists today. Currently the AAA has a central Committee whose objectives include promoting, protecting, and developing an anthropological perspective on human rights. While still emphasizing the importance of cultural differences, anthropologists now often support the protection of vulnerable cultures, non-discrimination, and the rights and land claims of indigenous peoples (see the AAA’s 2020 Statement on Anthropology and Human Rights). The conflict between relativists and human rights advocates may be partially based on differences in their underlying philosophical beliefs, particularly in metaethics. Relativists are often subjectivists or noncognitivists and think of morality as entirely socially constructed and transmitted. In contrast, philosophically-inclined human rights advocates are more likely to adhere to or presuppose cognitivism, moral realism, and intuitionism. As the AAA’s 1947 Statement shows, the accommodation of diversity has been a concern facing the contemporary human rights regime since its inception. As part of a 1946–47 UNESCO inquiry into the theoretical basis of human rights, the French philosopher, Jacques Maritain, famously suggested that universal agreement on human rights was possible so long as questions of underlying justification were ignored: “Yes… we agree about the rights but on condition no one asks us why” (Maritain 1949: 9). The International Bill of Human Rights appears to violate this embargo when it asserts, in the Preamble to both major Covenants, that “these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person”. Nonetheless, Maritain’s idea has strong echoes in contemporary philosophical work (see Taylor 1999), including John Rawls’ idea that human rights can have a minimal public or “political” justification which may be accepted from various “comprehensive” religious, moral, and philosophical points of view (Rawls 1999; Beitz 2009). Indeed, some have argued that international human rights law’s justificatory appeal to human dignity should be understood in precisely this ecumenical way (McCrudden 2008).  Other important methods of accommodating diversity include the abstract formulation of human rights norms, which allows for diverse, context-sensitive modes of social and institutional implementation (see Etinson 2013). As discussed in section 1, a modest understanding of the aims of human rights would leave more room for democratic decision-making at the domestic level, and for cultural and political variation across countries (see also the European Court of Human Rights’ notion of a “margin of appreciation”, discussed in Letsas 2006). And it is worth noting that, within limits, state parties to international human rights treaties are entitled to submit “reservations” that alter the legal effect of treaty provisions as they pertain to that state. This provides a further avenue for legal variation and accommodation. In the 1990s, Singapore’s Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew and others argued that international human rights as found in United Nations declarations and treaties were insensitive to distinctive “Asian values”, such as prizing families and community (in contrast to strong individualism); putting social harmony over personal freedom; respect for political leaders and institutions; and emphasizing responsibility, hard work, and thriftiness as means of social progress (on the Asian Values debate see Bauer & Bell [eds] 1999; Bell 2000; and Sen 1997). Proponents of the Asian values idea did not wish to abolish all human rights; they rather wanted to deemphasize some families of human rights, particularly the fundamental freedoms and rights of democratic participation (and in some cases the rights of women). They also wanted Western governments and NGOs to stop criticizing them for human rights violations in these areas. At the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, countries including Singapore, Malaysia, China, and Iran advocated accommodations within human rights practice for cultural and economic differences. Western representatives tended to view the position of these countries as excuses for repression and authoritarianism. The Conference responded by approving the Vienna Declaration. It included in Article 5 the assertion that countries should not pick and choose among human rights: All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.  In recent decades widespread acceptance of human rights has occurred in most parts of the world. Three quarters of the world’s countries have ratified the major human rights treaties, and many countries in Africa, the Americas, and Europe participate in regional human rights regimes that have international courts (see the Georgetown University Human Rights Law Research Guide in the Other Internet Resources below). Ratification does not, of course, guarantee compliance. Further, all of the world’s countries now use similar political institutions (law, courts, legislatures, executives, militaries, bureaucracies, police, prisons, taxation, and public schools) and these institutions carry with them characteristic problems and abuses (Donnelly 1989 [2020]). Finally, globalization has diminished the differences among peoples. Today’s world is not the one that early anthropologists and missionaries found. National and cultural boundaries are breached not just by international trade but also by millions of travelers and migrants, electronic communications, international law covering many areas, and the efforts of international governmental and non-governmental organizations. International influences and organizations are everywhere and countries borrow freely and regularly from each other’s inventions and practices.” Adam Etinson and James Nickel,  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Human Rights.  

A WESTERN CONCEPT?

“Critics of the notion that human rights are universal often assert that these rights are expressive of Western values, mores, and norms. The debate often hinges on the idea that though human rights are said to have universal validity, they originated in the West, reflect Western interests and are, therefore, a weapon of cultural hegemony or a new form of imperialism. Similarly, others argue that human rights emanate from a European, Judeo-Christian, and/or Enlightenment heritage (typically labeled Western) and cannot be enjoyed by other cultures that don’t emulate the conditions and values of “Western” societies.  Related to this are the challenges rooted in cultural relativism, i.e., that what Western civilizations consider universal norms in human rights may not be applicable to other cultures. The premise of the “Asian values” debate, for example, argues that the civil, political, social, and cultural norms advanced by the international human rights legal framework are Western, rather than universal, and, therefore, no more legitimate than alternative norms or standards that could be considered “Asian” or other. By the same token, the increasing use of exceptionalism claims rooted in religious assertions, as in the case of “Islamic human rights” or “traditional values” debates, have become more commonplace. What these narratives offered by critics deny is the pivotal struggle and experiences that gave rise to myriad international human rights instruments and mechanisms invoked across the globe today. All cultures—Western or otherwise—are acquainted with the experience of injustices, which beget demands for the recognition of human rights from oppressed populations that later give rise to human rights reforms. It is this “collective experience with injustice” which constitutes an authoritative foundation on which to build a theory of rights.  Moreover, debates focused on the origins of human rights or claims to historical or anthropological universality often obscure the fact that modern conceptualizations and articulations of human rights norms and standards were formed as political responses to the atrocities of the last World War. The international expressions of rights themselves claim no philosophical foundation, do not reflect any clear philosophical assumptions, and “articulate no particular moral principles or any single, comprehensive theory of the relation of the individual to society.” They are the outcome of diplomatic initiatives, involving political strategy and negotiated agreements. The claims of non-universality also fall flat when looking back at historical support for human rights. Fifty-eight countries assembled in 1948 to affirm their “faith in the dignity and worth of all persons” in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, wherein a framework for preserving that dignity and fostering respect for its worth was offered. Among these states were, African, Asian, and Latin American countries. Thirty-seven states were associated with Judeo-Christian traditions; 11 Islamic; six Marxist; and four identified as being associated with Buddhist-Confucian traditions.  It was Egyptian delegate, Omar Lutfi, who proposed that the UDHR reference the “universality” of human rights, noting that such rights should be applicable to “nations and people that were not autonomous,” meaning those persons still subject to colonial rule at the time. While social and economic rights were placed on the agenda as a result of pushes from the Arab States and the Soviet bloc, respectively. Forty-eight countries voted in favor (with eight abstentions and the other two countries not voting). Among the abstainers were Saudi Arabia, the Soviet bloc, which demanded more emphasis on socio‐economic rights than referenced in the document, and South Africa, whose government was openly hostile to the Declaration. As such, the UDHR was formed with major influence from non-Western states, thereby giving it legitimacy as a truly universally-applicable charter to guide humanity’s pursuit of peace and security. In proceeding years, Latin American and African countries, in addition to several European states, championed these rights through the establishment of initiatives and procedures for scrutinizing and reporting on human rights conditions and for advancing wide acceptance of human rights among diverse cultures (all of which ultimately led to the present-day UN Human Rights Council and its special procedures). By the mid-1960s, the number of countries participating in the process of constructing these standards had more than doubled. The presence of newly decolonized countries within the UN put self‐determination, anti‐discrimination rights, and, later, the right to development on the agenda. When the two Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights were forwarded to the UN General Assembly for final approval in 1966, there was no opposition of any kind. Both covenants were approved by unanimous votes of the General Assembly, which consisted of 100 members at that time.  Furthermore, states like Chile, Jamaica, Argentina, Ghana, the Philippines and others were vanguards for the advancement of concepts such as “protecting,” in addition to “promoting” human rights. In 1963, for example, fourteen non-Western UN member states requested that the General Assembly include a discussion on the Violation of Human Rights in South Viet-Nam on its agenda, alleging that the Diem regime had been perpetuating violations of rights of Vietnamese Buddhists in the country. The appeal resulted in the first iteration of a special procedure, led by the Chair of the Commission on Human Rights. Similarly, in 1967, a cross-regional group of states from Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and the Caribbean secured the adoption of two commission resolutions, establishing the first two Special Procedure mandates: the Ad-Hoc Working Group of Experts on southern Africa and the Special Rapporteur on Apartheid. The special procedures mechanism was thus established. Both resolutions were adopted by a vote, with most Western countries abstaining. The Need for Universality and Understanding As noted by some experts, there is actual wide acceptance that global standards are necessary for domestic political institutions, and that actual or threatened violations of these standards are reasonable grounds for action from the outside. This is a point in history without precedent and one which needs to be safeguarded. Civil society actors operating across the world depend on such international standards to anchor their claims for justice, but they often appear unaware of the degree to which their states were invested in the negotiations that created those standards. There is a richer, more complex story in need of recognition. This story must make clear the participation of “Global South” states in advancing recognition of human rights norms, and their leadership in establishing the accompanying international bodies and procedures for better realizing them.  We also cannot ignore the contribution of human rights groups across the globe today that continue to fill the gaps in the international human rights framework. This story is deserving of recognition in the halls of the UN and in parliaments around the world, for the human dignity of all persons. Dr. Ahmed Shaheed and Rose Parris Richter, Is “Human Rights” a Western Concept?